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CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
INTRODUCrION
The Tenth Circuit reviewed a large number of double jeopardy cases dur-
ing the 1995-96 Survey period.' The most remarkable of these occurred in the
arena of civil forfeiture.2 Prior to 1996, various circuits around the country
interpreted Supreme Court case holdings3 to mean that a civil in rem forfei-
ture following a criminal conviction constituted double jeopardy." In United
States v. Ursery,5 however, the court stated unambiguously that several cir-
cuits had misinterpreted those decisions. 6 Two Tenth Circuit cases demon-
strate the pre-Ursery posture7 and post-Ursery turnaround."
This Survey begins with a general discussion of the Double Jeopardy
Clause and Supreme Court precedent. Section II offers a discussion of the dual
issues arising in cases when a criminal conviction precedes or follows civil
sanctions, including in rem civil forfeitures of property used to further criminal
activity and civil monetary penalties in the form of fines. Section IMI addresses
multiple charges stemming from the same set of facts or occurrences. In Sec-
tion IV, the Survey tracks Tenth Circuit decisions regarding successive prose-
cutions in the form of retrials.
I. BACKGROUND
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states in part: "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." The Double Jeopardy Clause generally "protects against a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same of-
fense."'" While the Constitution only mentions "life or limb," double jeopar-
1. The Tenth Circuit reviewed approximately 51 cases involving the Double Jeopardy
Clause from September 1995 to September 1996. See, e.g., Yparrea v. Dorsey, 64 F.3d 577 (10th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Meyer, 95 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 1996).
2. See, e.g., United States v. 9844 South Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996); Unit-
ed States v. Lopez, 93 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1996).
3. See Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (holding that a
tax imposed on illegal drugs after criminal conviction and confiscation of the drugs constituted a
second punishment for the same offense); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (ruling
Eighth Amendment restrictions on excessive fines apply to in rem civil forfeiture); United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (stating a civil penalty not rationally related to the government's
actual damages may constitute punishment).
4. See infra notes 71-82, 142-53 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
6. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2144 (correcting the Sixth and Ninth Circuits' interpretation of
Kurth Ranch, Austin, and Halper).
7. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1483.
8. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 696-97 (1996).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
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dy protection also covers imprisonment and monetary penalties." The double
jeopardy doctrine originally prohibited a second trial for an offense after a
judgment for that same offense. 2 This made its application straightforward
and unambiguous. Modern legislative expansion of substantive crimes generat-
ed more complexity with respect to the overall issues and the elements that
comprise those crimes, providing fertile soil for inconsistent judicial applica-
tion, misunderstanding, and confusion. 3
Perhaps in part because of these complexities, courts have carved out
exceptions to these general principles. Double jeopardy does not bar civil
forfeitures, some remedial civil sanctions, two convictions arising out of the
same act if each offense requires proof of separate facts, or retrial of cases
infected by trial error. 4
I. MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS? CRIMINAL CONVICTION AND CIVIL SANCTIONS
A. Background
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Halper,5
Austin v. United States,'6 and Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch," the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. South Titan Court," assumed
that the Court had shifted its position regarding double jeopardy and civil
forfeiture. 9 The Supreme Court then clarified its position in United States v.
Urser9'° and announced to misguided circuits throughout the country that its
posture regarding civil forfeiture in the double jeopardy context remained
consistent with two hundred years of jurisprudence.' The Tenth Circuit's
holding in United States v. Lopez? demonstrated a complete turnaround from
South Titan Court and reflected the Tenth Circuit's new understanding in light
of Ursery.' To understand this development and the source of the Tenth
Circuit's earlier confusion, this background section briefly reviews the history
of civil forfeiture jurisprudence, the Supreme Court cases that led the Tenth
Circuit astray, and the content of the Court's clarification in Ursery.
11. Kurth Ranch, 114S. CL at 1941 n.l.
12. Adam R. Fox, The Ninth Circuit Renegade-United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Curren-
cy: Finding Double Jeopardy in a Single Coordinated Prosecution, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
67, 68-69 (1995).
13. James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine
and the Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 117-18 (1995).
14. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2142; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932);
Fox, supra note 12, at 69-71.
15. 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
16. 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
17. 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994).
18. 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cit. 1996).
19. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1483-84.
20. 116 S. CL 2135 (1996).
21. Ursery, 116 S. CL at 2142-44; see infra notes 72-82, 129-53 and accompanying text
(analyzing the Tenth, Second, Ninth, and Eighth Circuits' misunderstanding of the Court's posi-
tion on civil forfeitures).
22. 93 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1996).
23. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 696-97.
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1. Civil Forfeiture: Historical Context
Civil forfeiture originated in the law of admiralty and dates back two
centuries.24 In early admiralty cases, the forfeiture of property used in crimi-
nal activity did not constitute double jeopardy because courts treated the prop-
erty itself, not its owner, as the cause of the offense.' The fiction of the
"guilty vessel" stemmed from the desire to quickly and efficiently seize ships
used for illegal activities without the burdens and delays associated with due
process and conviction of the owners.' This type of seizure was especially
appealing in an era when the owners often lived half the world away and no
efficient modes of communication or travel existed. One of the earliest exam-
ples of the guilty property concept appears in an 1827 case in which a United
States vessel captured a Spanish privateer, the Palmyra.7 The Court permit-
ted the Palmyra's forfeiture prior to the owner's conviction since the forfeiture
statute created in rem jurisdiction (against the property), independent of a
criminal proceeding in personam (against the person).' This rendered con-
cepts such as guilt or innocence of the owner and commensurate validity of
the punishment irrelevant."
2. Civil Forfeiture: Austin v. United States3
Some commentators and courts viewed Austin v. United States as signal-
ing a shift toward treating civil forfeitures as punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.3' On June 13, 1990, Richard Lyle Austin met Keith Engebretson at
Austin's body shop and agreed to sell Engebretson cocaine. Austin left the
shop, went to his mobile home, and then returned to the shop with two grams
of cocaine.32 The trial court convicted Austin and sentenced him to seven
years in prison for the drug offense.33 The government obtained forfeiture of
Austin's mobile home and auto body shop under the Drug Abuse Prevention
24. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Van Oster
v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); Dobbins Dis-
tillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377 (1866);
Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 1
(1827); Phile qui tam v. The Ship Anna, 1 U.S. (1 Dal].) 197 (1787).
25. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Les-
sons from Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 79, 93 (1996) ("The legal fiction was
that the property itself, without human intervention, caused the harm or violated the law."); see,
e.g., United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844) ("The vessel
which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which
forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.").
26. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 25, at 119-20;, see also, e.g., United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (noting the historical necessity of seiz-
ing personal property, which can abscond, to establish jurisdiction over the property).
27. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 8.
28. Id. at 14-15.
29. Harmony, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 234.
30. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
31. See J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Wind Out of Government Sails?: Forfeitures and Just
Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 449, 474-75 (1996); Robert M. Sondak, The Tide is Turning:
Civil Forfeiture Law is Becoming More Accommodating to Innocent Mortgagees, 48 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 178, 179-80 (1994).
32. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1993).
33. 1l at 604.
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and Control Act (DAPCA),' on the theory that Austin used these items, like
the Spanish vessel Palmyra, in the commission of the crime.' Thus, the gov-
ernment forced Austin to forfeit several thousand dollars worth of property as
a result of his selling several hundred dollars worth of illicit narcotics.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether the
forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.37 Finding
that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court did not ad-
dress the issue of double jeopardy.' Since the Eighth Amendment limits the
government's power to impose monetary punishments, the Court's decision
turned on whether a civil forfeiture, like monetary fines, constitutes punish-
ment under DAPCA § 881(A)(4) and (a)(7).39
The Austin Court outlined the historical foundation for civil forfeiture as
consisting of: 1) the fiction that the property itself was guilty and/or 2) the
notion that the owner assumed responsibility for the acts of those to whom the
owner entrusted property.' In reality, the Court stated, owner negligence
formed the basis of both rationales. According to the Court, the fiction of
culpable property under the first rationale could not justify forfeiture when the
owner took all reasonable measures to prevent the unlawful use of the
property.4' Under the second rationale, the Court noted, the law holds owners
accountable for acts committed by those to whom owners negligently assign
their property.42 Citing extensive historical precedent, the Court affirmed that
forfeiture always serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.43 Thus, the
Court determined that Eighth Amendment restrictions on excessive fines apply
to in rem civil forfeiture without reaching the issue of double jeopardy."
34. DAPCA authorizes the forfeiture of:
(4) [alll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of [controlled substances].
(6) [a]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance ....
(7) [all real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements,
which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate
the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1994).
35. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615-16.
36. Joseph B. Harrington, Austin v. United States: Forfeiture as Punishment and the Impli-
cations for Warrantless Seizures, 4 B.U. PuB. INT. LJ. 415, 419 (1995).
37. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604. The Excessive Fines Clause prohibits excessive bail, fines, and
cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. Vm.
38. Id. at 617-23.
39. Id. at 610.
40. Id. at 615.
41. Id. at 615-16 (citing Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 511).
42. d. at 616-18.
43. Id. at 618.
44. Id. at 621-22.
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3. Civil Monetary Penalty: United States v. Halper' and Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch.'
Courts historically have held that government officials do not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause when they impose a remedial civil sanction and a
criminal punishment for the same offense.' These holdings stem from the
position that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments
for the same offense and that civil penalties are not traditionally designed to
punish.' However, the Supreme Court appeared to retreat from this position
in Halper.
In Halper, the government sought $130,000 in fines for $585 in damages
on top of a $5,000 fine and two years in prison for violating the False Claims
Act.' Noting the outcome depended on the facts of each case, the Court nev-
ertheless ruled that a civil action may constitute punishment and trigger the
Double Jeopardy Clause.' While the Court failed to establish a specific
threshold for when a civil action passes into the realm of punishment, it suc-
ceeded in setting forth a generalized rule of proportionality which balances the
damages to the government against the penalty imposed on the defendant."
The Court stated that a reasonableness rule applies, with a civil penalty consti-
tuting a second punishment only if it "bears no rational relation to the goal of
compensating the Government for its loss."52 In Halper, the Court concluded
that a penalty 220 times the government's damages constituted a judgment not
rationally related to the purpose of compensating the government. 3
The Supreme Court, in Kurth Ranch, expanded the range of civil sanc-
tions that may constitute punishment and give rise to a double jeopardy
claim.5' The Court held that a tax imposed on illegal drugs, after a criminal
conviction and confiscation of the drugs, subjected the defendants to multiple
punishments for the same offense." Conceding that the government generally
levies taxes to generate revenue, as opposed to furthering punitive goals, the
Court held that a tax could nonetheless constitute punishment for double jeop-
ardy purposes in certain instances.' In Kurth Ranch, the State of Montana
imposed a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs where the tax:
(1) resulted from the perpetration of a crime; (2) served punitive rather than
45. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
46. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Eric Michael Anielak, Note, Double Jeopardy: Protection Against Multiple
Punishments, 61 Mo. L. REv. 169, 171 (1996) (discussing the dual imposition of civil sanctions
and criminal penalties in the context of Kurth Ranch).
48. Id
49. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982) (amended 1994)).
50. Halper, 490 U.S. at 443, 448.
51. Id at 448-49.
52. Id at 449.
53. Id at 451.
54. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945-48.
55. Id. (noting that the government imposed the tax under Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax
Act, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (repealed 1995)). See Charles K. Todd, Jr., The
Supreme Court Assaults State Drug Taxes with a Double Jeopardy Dagger: Death Blow, Serious
Injury, or Flesh Wound?, 29 IND. L. REV. 695, 695-96 (1996).
56. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. CL at 1946.
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revenue generating purposes; and, (3) attached to goods which the taxpayer
did not own at the time of taxation and never lawfully possessed in the first
place.57 The Court termed this drug tax a "concoction of anomalies" distinct
from a standard property tax, and characterized the tax as punishment."'
4. Ursery v. United States,9
In United States v. Ursery," the Sixth Circuit construed Austin and
Halper to mean that civil forfeiture constitutes punishment for double jeopardy
purposes.6 The suit commenced when Michigan police found marijuana
growing in Ursery's house.' In addition to a criminal indictment for the drug
offense, the government initiated civil forfeiture proceedings against the house
under DAPCA. 3 Contending that, consistent with Halper and Austin, the civ-
il forfeiture proceeding constituted punishment, the Sixth Circuit reversed on
double jeopardy grounds.'
Citing double jeopardy precedent concerning civil forfeiture proceed-
ings,' the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that, as a remedial civil
sanction, in rem civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment under the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause.' Halper, the Court reasoned, involved a civil penalty,
not a civil forfeiture.67 While a civil monetary penalty may operate punitively
when the fine sufficiently outweighs the government's damages, well estab-
lished case law demonstrates that in rem civil forfeiture, as an action against
the property itself, does not constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.' The Court distinguished Ursery from Austin by holding that the lat-
ter addressed the Excessive Fines Clause.' While the Court conceded in Aus-
tin that judicial decisionmakers could characterize a forfeiture as punishment
and subject it to the Excessive Fines Clause, Austin only mentioned the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause in a footnote asserting its inapplicability to in rem civil
57. Id. at 1947-48.
58. Id. at 1948.
59. 116 S. CL 2135. The Court also reviewed United States v. $405,089.23 United States
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), in which defendants convicted of conspiracy and money
laundering were subsequently forced to undergo an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding. The Ninth
Circuit contended that the forfeiture violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
$405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1214; see also supra text accompanying notes 9-
12. The Supreme Court reversed for reasons set forth in its concurrent review of United States v.
Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
60. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995).
61. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 571-73.
62. Ursery, 116 S. CL 2135, 2138-39 (1996).
63. Id. at 570; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
64. Ursery, 59 F.3d at 568.
65. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); Various Items of
Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
66. Ursery, 116 S. CL at 2141-42.
67. Id. at 2144-45.
68. Id. at 2145. The Court applied a two-part test. First, the Court inquired whether Congress
intended the forfeiture to be criminal or civil. Second, the Court asked if the forfeiture proceedings
were "so punitive in fact as to 'persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately
be viewed as civil in nature,' despite Congress' intent" Id. at 2147 (citing 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
at 366).
69. Id. at 2146.
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forfeiture proceedings. 0 The Court dismissed Kurth Ranch as irrelevant to
Ursery since the former involved a tax anomalous to standard taxes in that it
served a punitive, rather than a revenue generating, purpose.7'
B. In rem Civil Forfeiture: Pre-Ursery
1. United States v. 9844 South Titan Court'
a. Facts
On June 18, 1992, the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado convicted Philip May of possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute and other related crimes." The Court sentenced May to ten years in pris-
on, ordered him to pay a $12,500 fine, and assessed against him the cost of
incarceration estimated at $100,000. 74 On July 8, 1992, the government filed
a forfeiture action under DAPCA" against the residential and business prop-
erties which housed the cocaine.76 May contended that the Supreme Court
overruled the traditional notion that civil forfeiture does not constitute punish-
ment with its decisions in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, and that his crimi-
nal punishment subsequent to the civil forfeiture amounted to double jeopar-
dy."
b. Decision
Citing the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. $405,089.23 United
States Currency,7 the Tenth Circuit stated: "Austin makes it clear that for-
feitures under [DAPCA] are punishment, and we agree with the Ninth Circuit
that there is no difference between the excessive fines and the double jeopardy
definition of punishment." 9 Relying on Halper and Kurth Ranch, the court
found that two trials constitute two jeopardies.s Thus, even though the
criminal and civil proceedings derived from the same overall prosecution, they
constituted two distinct efforts to punish, which placed the defendant in double
70. Id. at 2144-46 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 n.4).
71. Id. at 2147. The Ursery Court explained:
Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Kurth
Ranch with a tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and Austin with civil
forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause. None of those cases dealt with the subject
of this case: in rem civil forfeitures for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
I&a
72. 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996).
73. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1475.
74. Id.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
76. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1475.
77. Id. at 1483-84.
78. 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994). Guided by Halper and. Austin, the Ninth Circuit
barred the forfeiture of property under DAPCA. The court asserted that the forfeiture constituted
punishment for the same drug related conduct for which the defendants had already been convict-
ed in the criminal proceedings. Thus, the forfeiture was a violation of double jeopardy. Id.
79. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484.
80. Id. at 1487.
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jeopardy." The court found that the forfeiture of May's house and business
property amounted to a second punishment after May's criminal conviction on
drug related charges, and barred the forfeitures on double jeopardy grounds.'
C. In rem Civil Forfeiture: Post-Ursery
1. United States v. Lopez 3
a. Facts
On January 13, 1993, a search of Johnny Lopez's apartment revealed
eight kilograms of cocaine, twenty kilograms of marijuana, $100,000, and a
warranty deed conveying title to a residence." The government asserted that
the money and residence were used in, or were proceeds of, the drug activi-
ties.' Pursuant to DAPCA,? the court entered a judgment of civil in rem
forfeiture against the cash and the residence." Subsequent to the forfeiture,
the government filed an indictment based on unlawful possession of the drugs
with intent to distribute."8 Lopez filed a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds. 9 The district court found against Lopez since the prior civil forfei-
ture action involved elements not present in the criminal charges."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled against the defendant since Ursery rendered the
double jeopardy issue irrelevant 9 The Tenth Circuit recognized that under
Ursery, in rem civil forfeiture is not considered punishment for purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.' Thus, even if the government based its in rem
civil forfeiture and criminal indictment on the same offense, the defendant
could not invoke double jeopardy protection since the forfeiture failed to con-
stitute punishment and therefore never placed the defendant in jeopardy in the
first place.9
D. In Rem Civil Forfeiture: Pre-Ursery but Double Jeopardy Claim
Rejected On Other Grounds
81. Id. at 1487-88.
82. Id. at 1484.
83. 93 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1996).
84. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 695.
85. Id.
86. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); see full text supra note 34.
87. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 695.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 696.
90. Id. One of the additional elements involved aiding a racketeering enterprise. id.
91. Id. at 697.
92. Id. at 698 (citing Ursery, 116 S. CL at 2149).
93. Id. at 696-97.
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1. United States v. Cordoba94
a. Facts
A search of Romualdo Cordoba's van unearthed 10 kilograms of co-
caine.95 The government instituted a civil forfeiture action against the van
under DAPCA.9 On the same day, the government charged Cordoba with
possession and intent to distribute cocaine. 9 Subsequently, the government
seized a $10,000 check and a Corvette contending that both were drug pro-
ceeds.9" Cordoba agreed to the forfeiture of all property as part of a plea
agreement." Prior to sentencing, however, Cordoba filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that the forfeiture and the criminal conviction violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause." ° The district court denied the motion to dismiss and the
defendant raised the same argument on appeal."0
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that since Cordoba had consented to the forfeiture
in his plea agreement, he waived any right to object on double jeopardy
grounds." Although the plea agreement made no reference to double jeopar-
dy and Cordoba potentially failed to understand his possible defenses, he nev-
ertheless waived his right to the claim." Thus, "Mhe Double Jeopardy
Clause... does not relieve a defendant from the consequence(s) of his volun-
tary choice.' °
2. United States v. German"'
a. Facts
The government indicted Daniel German for possession with intent to
distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana after seizing German's truck,
which he used to transport the drug, under DAPCA." At the time of
German's arrest, the government gave him a "Notice of Seizure of a Convey-
ance for a Drug-Related Offense" which advised him of the forthcoming sei-
zure."'7 The government subsequently sent a notice providing German with
further details of the seizure and German signed a receipt acknowledging that
94. 71 F.3d 1543 (10th Cir. 1995).
95. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1544.
96. Id; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4).
97. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1544.
98. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(6).
99. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1545.
100. Id. at 1545-46.
101. Id. at 1545.
102. Id. at 1546.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1979)).
105. 76 F.3d 315 (10th Cir. 1996). For cases pertaining to the rule of law discussed in
German, see United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hardwell, 80
F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Denogean, 79 F.3d 1010 (loth Cir. 1996).
106. German, 76 F.3d at 316; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4).
107. German, 76 F.3d at 316.
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he received it."e However, German failed to submit a claim of ownership
along with a cost bond or an in forma pauperis declaration by the dead-
line."° Thus, German resorted to an administrative ruling which resulted in
the forfeiture of the truck."0 German then filed a motion to dismiss the crim-
inal indictment on double jeopardy grounds."' The court held that because
German did not judicially contest the forfeiture by filing a claim of ownership
and bond in district court, the government never adjudicated his alleged culpa-
bility nor placed German in jeopardy."2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's assertion that his double jeop-
ardy claim survived despite his failure to contest the forfeiture in district
court.1 3 The Tenth Circuit instead affirmed the district court and stated that
since German failed to contest the civil forfeiture by filing a claim of owner-
ship and bond, he did not become a party to the forfeiture proceeding."
4
Thus, the court never made a determination of guilt, and, for double jeopardy
purposes, the government never punished German in the first place.'
E. Monetary Penalty
1. United States v. Hudson' 
6
a. Facts
John Hudson, Larry Beresel, and Jack Rackley consented to pay the Of-
fice of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") $16,600, $15,000, and
$15,000, respectively for alleged banking violations."' After the government
indicted the defendants for the same mis-allocations of bank funds that gave
rise to the OCC sanctions, the defendants moved to dismiss based on double
jeopardy."" The district court rejected the claim, asserting that the fines
served remedial, not punitive, purposes."9 The Tenth Circuit vacated and re-
manded so that the district court could ascertain the actual loss to the govern-
ment and substantiate its assertion that the fines were solely remedial based on
evidence that a rational relation existed between the fines and the
108. ld. at 316-17.
109. Id. at 317.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 318-19.
113. Id. at 319.
114. Id. at 319-20.
115. Id. at 318-19 (citing United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994)). Both
the Third and the Fifth Circuits used similar reasoning to conclude defendants who failed to con-
test civil forfeiture actions never became parties and thus were never "punished" for double jeop-
ardy purposes. See United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1995).
116. 92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Hudson I1].
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government's damages.' On remand, an evidentiary hearing revealed that
the OCC incurred $72,000 in expenses to pursue the defendants. 2 ' However,
the court concluded that the sanction served punitive purposes since the OCC
desired to use the fines to deter future violations." Thus, the district court
concluded that the indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause." The
government then appealed the district court's ruling. 24
b. Decision
Relying on Halper, the court asserted that the only issue on appeal con-
cerned whether the fine was grossly disproportionate to the sanction such that
the latter advanced more than remedial purposes."n Under the test in Halper,
the defendant suffers no punishment if a rational relationship exists between
the fine and the aim of compensating the government for its loss." 6 Since
the government proved damages of $72,000 and the fines amounted to
$46,600, the court found the fines rationally related to the government's dam-
ages.'27 Thus, the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
sanctions were not solely remedial."n
F. Analysis
The Supreme Court's holding in Ursery left many circuits scrambling to
find a graceful way to assume a completely different posture with respect to in
rem civil forfeitures and double jeopardy.' The Tenth Circuit underwent
this adjustment as evidenced by its pre-Ursery decision in Titan Court and
post-Ursery realignment in Lopez.
In Titan Court, the Tenth Circuit relied on Halper, Kurth Ranch, and
Austin to determine that civil forfeiture may constitute punishment and that no
distinction between civil and criminal punishments exists.' ° Thus, imposing
multiple punishments for the same activity constitutes a violation of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause.' 3' The precedent offered through Austin particularly
compelled the Tenth Circuit because the court based the punishment in Titan
Court on the same statute (DAPCA) and subsections' as the forfeiture in
Austin.'33 Thus, the Tenth Circuit readily concurred with the Ninth
Circuit " that no difference exists between "the excessive fines and the dou-
120. United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536 (10th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Hudson I].
121. Id.
122. Hudson I1, 92 F.3d at 1028.
123. Id. at 1027.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1028.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1028-29.
128. Id. at 1030.
129. See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
130. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484.
131. Id. at 1484.
132. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7).
133. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484.
134. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219; see supra note 59 (describing the
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ble jeopardy definition of punishment."'3
However, in Ursery the Court stated that excessiveness under the Eighth
Amendment does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes
under the Fifth AmendmentY" Six months after the Tenth Circuit decided
Titan Court, and two months after the Supreme Court's holding in Ursery, the
Tenth Circuit heard the Lopez case. Like Titan Court, Lopez involved a crimi-
nal indictment for unlawful possession of drugs with intent to distribute and a
civil in rem forfeiture action against property related to the drug offense under
DAPCA. Heeding the Ursery avouchment, the Tenth Circuit rejected as
non-pertinent the double jeopardy issues surrounding the civil forfeiture."
As with Titan Court, Cordoba and German involved double jeopardy
claims resulting from criminal indictments and civil forfeitures relating to drug
offenses. Although the Tenth Circuit decided Cordoba and German in a pre-
Ursery arena under the misapprehension civil forfeitures constituted punish-
ment, the Tenth Circuit avoided the issue by disposing of them on other
grounds. By consenting to the forfeiture in Cordoba, the defendant waived his
right to a double jeopardy claim.'" Because the defendant failed to contest
the forfeiture in German, the court never recognized him as a party and conse-
quently never technically punished him.'
Hudson did not involve a civil forfeiture. Rather, like Halper, it entailed a
monetary penalty. The Tenth Circuit in Hudson appropriately initiated a
straightforward application of Halper since monetary penalties remained unaf-
fected by Ursery. Since the fine was not grossly disproportionate and was
rationally related to the costs incurred by the government, it was not punish-
ment for the purposes of double jeopardy."'
G. Other Circuits
Like the Tenth Circuit, other Circuits reconciled their decisions with the
Court's holding in Ursery and found that civil forfeiture does not constitute
punishment for purposes of the Fifth Amendment."2 However, while still in
the pre-Ursery information vacuum, the Second Circuit postulated that the
Halper disproportionality test applied to civil forfeiture.'" The Second Cir-
Ninth Circuit's position in $405,089.23 United States Currency).
135. South Titan Court, 75 F.3d at 1484 (citing $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d
at 1219).
136. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
137. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881 (a)(6) - (a)(7).
138. Lopez, 93 F.3d at 698.
139. Cordoba, 71 F.3d at 1546.
140. German, 76 F.3d at 318-19.
141. Hudson il, 92 F.3d at 1029. Other circuits agree that the post-Ursery litigation arena
leaves Halper-type civil sanction cases unaffected. See, e.g., S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Review Comm'n, 96 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Halper to determine
that a fine was so grossly disproportionate that double jeopardy attached).
142. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
143. United States v. G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 490 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Unit-
ed States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992)). The court offered a long
perusal of the meaning of Halper, Kurth Ranch, and Austin, but left a definitive determination to a
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cuit also suggested that Austin opened the door to punishment considerations
in the realm of civil forfeiture.'" After Ursery, the Second Circuit conceded.
"Austin conveyed the impression to many federal courts that civil forfeiture
should also be considered 'punishment' for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment... Ursery has effectively repudiated
[that] ... impression. . .. "
The Ninth Circuit entertained the same pre-Ursery understanding when it
ruled in United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, one of the lower
court cases overturned in Ursery.'" Two months after the Ursery decision,
the Ninth Circuit had occasion to decide another case involving a civil in rem
forfeiture under DAPCA."' In addition to conceding that Ursery required re-
versal of $405,089.23 United States Currency, the Ninth Circuit briefly ex-
plained Ursery's two-pronged test,'4 and asserted that the application of this
test resulted in the conclusion that "civil in rem forfeitures pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) do not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Because [the defendant's] property was forfeited pursuant to
this section, his double jeopardy claim necessarily fails."' 4 Thus, this hold-
ing marked a complete turn around by the Ninth Circuit in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Ursery.
Like the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit allowed the for-
feiture of a vessel which the owners used to transport drugs in addition to the
criminal indictment for the drug offenses'5 The court explained, "[-until
recently, it was unclear whether a criminal defendant was subject to double
jeopardy when the government attempted civil forfeiture of property... The
Supreme Court greatly clarified this area of the law with its decision in United
States v. Ursery."'' Nevertheless, the court addressed the issue of excessive
fines and acknowledged that a defendant might still find relief under the
Eighth Amendment's umbrella.' Further, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
civil sanctions such as fines may still constitute punishment for double jeopar-
dy purposes if they are "divorced from the government's damages and expens-
es."'53
later date because the "broader jurisprudential developments" relating to double jeopardy occurred
after the appeal was briefed and argued. Id at 492.
144. G.P.S. Automotive, 66 F.3d at 491-92.
145. United States v. Certain Funds, 96 F.3d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Brophil, 96 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 1996).
146. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1996).
147. United States v. Sardone, 94 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1996); see aLso 21 U.S.C. § 881.
148. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
149. Sardone, 94 F.3d at 1236.
150. United States v. One 1970 36.9' Columbia Sailing Boat, 91 F.3d 1053, 1056 (8th Cir.
1996); see aLso United States v. Quinn, 95 F.3d 8 (8th Cir. 1996).
151. Columbia Sailing Boat, 91 F.3d at 1055-56.
152. Id. at 1057-58. However, the court concluded that in this instance the fine was not ex-
cessive. Id. at 1058.
153. United States v. Gartner, 93 F.3d 633, 634 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at
442).
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Within the double jeopardy context, "multiplicity" occurs when the same
behavior constitutes more than one criminal offense.' " To establish a viola-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the defendant must show that the multiple
offenses charged derive from the same facts. ' In 1932, the Supreme Court
established two tests to determine what comprises a single "offense."'" First,
in the event of a continuing series of homogeneous acts, for example, tearing
several mail bags open at one time, the test asks whether the law prohibits the
individual act or the overall course of conduct.'" If the law forbids the indi-
vidual act, then each act amounts to a separate offense.ss If the law enjoins
the overall course of conduct, then each act combines to form a single of-
fense. 5 Thus, if the law prohibits tearing open a mail bag, then each mail
bag violation results in a separate offense."W Second, if one act violates two
distinct statutory provisions, the test asks whether each provision requires
proof of at least one element not required in the other provision. 6 '
For example, in Blockburger v. United States,s" the Supreme Court up-
held the defendant's conviction for violating two separate offenses after he
sold morphine hydrochloride in violation of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic
Act."6 The first offense stemmed from selling the drug in some form other
than in the original stamped package.'" The second offense resulted from
selling the drug without a written order.'" The courts frequently employ this
second test and often refer to it as the "Blockburger analysis" or "Blockburger
test."'" However, the Blockburger test will not control if the legislature in-
tends to create two separate offenses. 6
154. United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1551 (10th Cir. 1996).
155. Id. at 1551-52.
156. Blockburger 284 U.S. at 302-03.
157. id.; see, e.g., United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 1995) (up-
holding a sentence of three consecutive prison terms for use of a firearm, even though the same
firearm was used in the course of the three underlying offenses).
158. Id.
159. BLockburger, 284 U.S. at 302.
160. Id. at 303.
161. Id. at 304.
162. Id. at 301.
163. Id. at 300-01; see also Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, ch. 136, §§ 1005-1007, 42 Star. 298-
301 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
164. Id. at 301 n.1
165. Id. at 303-04.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
167. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359 (1983)).
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2. Lesser or Greater Included Offenses
Lesser or greater included offenses do not survive the Blockburger test
since courts treat the two offenses as one and the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
multiple or successive prosecutions." Although the greater offense includes
at least one element not required in the lesser offense, the lesser offense re-
quires no different elements than those required in the greater offense." For
example, assault with a dangerous weapon includes the lesser included offense
of assault. While assault with a dangerous weapon includes elements not con-
tained in assault per se, assault requires no other elements than those contained
in assault with a dangerous weapon. In such situations the government can not
invoke the Blockburger test, which requires unique elements in each offense,
and a defendant's Double Jeopardy Clause challenge should succeed. 7°
This rule clearly applies in the event of a conviction for a greater offense
followed by prosecutions for lesser included offenses since convictions for the
latter require no proof beyond that which satisfied the conviction criteria for
the former. "' However, prosecution for a greater offense followed by con-
viction for a lesser included offense resulting from new developments in the
case or charges from different subdivisions of a jurisdiction presents a more
complex and ambiguous scenario.
In Brown v. Ohio," the Supreme Court clarified this scenario when it
ruled irrelevant the sequence of trial for greater and lesser included offens-
es."' In Brown, the defendant stole a car from Cleveland, Ohio, and the po-
lice apprehended him while he was driving in Wickliffe, Ohio.'74 The
Wickliffe police charged the defendant of joyriding, which involves taking or
operating a car without the owner's consent." After the defendant served
jail time in Wickliffe, the police returned him to Cleveland, where authorities
indicted him for auto theft, which consists of joyriding with intent to perma-
nently deprive the owner of possession. Thus, joyriding represents a lesser
included offense in the greater offense of auto theft.'" Applying the
Blockburger test, the Court held that joyriding and auto theft serve as the same
offense for double jeopardy purposes, and barred conviction for the greater
offense of auto theft.'"
However, the Court in Brown conceded that exceptions might apply
"where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset
because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred
or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence."' Thus,




172. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
173. Brown, 432 U.S. at 168.
174. Id. at 162.
175. ld.
176. Id. at 162-64.
177. Id. at 162-63.
178. Id. at 168-69.
179. Id. at 169 n.7.
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if the greater offense depends on facts that develop after the first trial, the
courts may allow successive prosecutions."0 The Court applied this excep-
tion in Garrett where the greater offense depended on facts occurring after the
trial for the lesser offense such that the latter did not bar a subsequent prose-
cution for the greater offense.'
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Yparrea v. Dorsey"n
a. Facts
Christopher Yparrea broke into a house and stole some of its contents."l
The court convicted Yparrea separately of larceny and burglary and enhanced
his sentence by eight years based on New Mexico's habitual criminal offender
statute.' After losing in state court, Yparrea filed a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that the enhancement of his sentence constituted a violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause since the sentences were based on the same underly-
ing conduct."' A magistrate dismissed the claim and the district court dis-
missed the petition."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted that, while burglary requires entry into the dwell-
ing, larceny does not."v Further, larceny requires an actual confiscation,
which burglary does not." Applying the Blockburger test, the court deter-
mined that since each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does
not, the defendant could not take refuge under the cover of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause."
2. United States v. Richardson90
a. Facts
The district court convicted Bobby Richardson on separate offenses of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to dis-
tribute methamphetamine.' 9' On appeal, Richardson asserted that, because the
authorities found the two substances together in his toolshed, possession of the
substances constituted a single offense, and therefore the separate convictions
180. Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 13, at 149-50.
181. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 791-93.
182. 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995).
183. Yparrea, 64 F.3d at 578.
184. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Michie 1996).
185. Yparrea, 64 F.3d at 578-79.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 580.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 579-80.
190. 86 F.3d 1537 (10th Cr. 1996).
191. Richardson, 86 F.3d at 1542.
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resulted in a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause."9
b. Decision
The plain language of DAPCA, 93 upon which the district court based
the convictions, reveals congressional intent to treat possession of different
controlled substances as separate offenses. 94 Further, the legislative history
offers no contrary evidence.' Thus, the court concluded that Richardson's
convictions did not merit double jeopardy protection.'96
3. United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre'"
a. Facts
Gabriel Rodriquez-Aquirre served a sentence for conspiracy to distribute
marijuana in Kansas."9 Authorities in New Mexico subsequently indicted
Aquirre, along with his co-conspirators, for activities arising out of a drug
distribution ring.' 99 After a mistrial in district court, a grand jury indicted
Aguirre on all twenty-two counts." One count charged Aguirre with engag-
ing in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE").' Aguirre moved to dis-
miss this count arguing that the conspiracy conviction in Kansas was a lesser
included offense of the CCE count such that the conspiracy conviction pre-
vented the government under Brown from retrying him on the greater CCE of-
fense.' The district court denied the motion.2'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that because the Kansas indictment alleged that the
conspiracy continued until March of 1989 and the New Mexico indictment
pertained to charges continuing through December of 1993, it did not
constitute the same offense.' The court concluded that when a defendant
continues unlawful conduct after prosecution, the state may still use that
unlawful conduct in another case to prove a continuing violation.'
192. Id. at 1552.
193. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
194. Richardson, 86 F.3d at 1553 (citing United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 461-62




197. 73 F.3d 1023 (10th Cir. 1996).
198. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 73 F.3d at 1024.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. The CCE was in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. Id.
202. Id. at 1025.
203. Id. at 1024.
204. Id. at 1026.
205. Id. at 1026-27 (citing Garrett, 471 U.S. at 798).
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C. Analysis
The facts of Yparrea suggest treating the larceny as a "lesser included
offense" of the burglary.2' However, although both convictions arose out of
the same conduct, the harsh reality under the Blockburger test is that they
represent two separate offenses if each conviction requires the proof of dif-
ferent facts.' The drug convictions in Richardson embraced no separate ele-
ments nor required a different set of facts.2 However, congressional intent
trumped Blockburger and required that the convictions receive treatment as
separate offenses.' Thus, the hierarchical order of authority places the plain
wording of the statute first, the legislative history second, and the Blockburger
test last.21
While the State of Kansas convicted the defendant in Rodriguez-Aguirre
of the lesser included offense of conspiracy to distribute marijuana, such that
courts would typically bar the greater offense of CCE under the Blockburger
test, " Rodriguez-Aguirre offered the exception set forth in Brown and ap-
plied in Garrett. Namely, since the greater offense depended on facts that
occurred after the first trial, double jeopardy was not applicable."'
D. Other Circuits
While the Supreme Court's holdings in Blockburger, Brown, and Garrett
tended to homogenize circuit court decisions with respect to the issues raised
in Yparrea and Rodriguez-Aguirre, the Court's analysis in Richardson failed to
provide a similar clarifying rationale. Although the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits concur with the Tenth Circuit regarding its decision
to treat the simultaneous possession of varying controlled substances as sepa-
rate offenses, they offer differing reasons for their results."3' DAPCA pro-
hibits the knowing manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of "a" controlled
substance.214 The Sixth Circuit held that simultaneous possession of heroin
and methadone constituted separate offenses since the statute deems heroin a
schedule I controlled substance while it regards methadone as a schedule II
substance for purposes of punishment."5 The Fifth Circuit asserted that when
Congress passed DAPCA it intended to give judges maximum flexibility in
fashioning sentences." 6 An interpretation treating all controlled substances
206. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
207. Yparrea, 64 F.3d at 579-80.
208. Richardson, 86 F.3d at 1549.
209. Id. at 1553.
210. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779; see also Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 13, at 122-
25 (discussing the relationship between the Blockburger test and legislative intent).
211. Shellenberger & Strazzella, supra note 13, at 146-47.
212. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 73 F.3d at 1026-27.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 215-225.
214. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (emphasis added).
215. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 1977).
216. United States v. Davis, 656 F.2d 153, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing MR. REP. No. 91-
1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4570).
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possessed simultaneously as one offense restricts that flexibility."' The
Fourth Circuit cited to the Sixth Circuit and held that, since drugs listed in
different schedules mandate different penalties, Congress intended the posses-
sion of each scheduled drug to constitute a separate violation."' The Second
Circuit brushed the surface of several arguments by contending that Congress
left one of the Second Circuit's prior decisions allowing the imposition of
cumulative sentences for possession of different drugs undisturbed when it
passed DAPCA.219 The Second Circuit embraced the separate schedule prop-
osition first offered by the Sixth Circuit as well as the congressional intent
assertion introduced by the Fifth Circuit.2 The First Circuit also adopted the
congressional intent validation for treating different drugs as separate offenses
and argued that the plain meaning of §841(a)(1) creates a violation for a con-
trolled substance and not a group of controlled substances."2 The Supreme
Court declined to clarify the rationale for treating different, simultaneously
possessed substances as separate offenses when it denied certiorari in the cases
arising out of the First,m Second,m Fourth, w and Fifthm Circuits.
IV. SuCcusivE PROSCUTrIONS: R RiAL
A. Background
In Lockhart v. Nelsonm , the Supreme Court affirmed a century of juris-
prudence by holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial
when a conviction is set aside due to an error in the trial proceedings.' 2 The
Court set forth the following policy rationale: "[I]t would be a high price
indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punish-
ment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error .... 228
In Lockhart, the appellate court reversed the initial conviction based on errone-
ous admission of evidence.' 9 The Court found that as long as sufficient evi-
dence exists to sustain a guilty verdict, even if it would have been insufficient
without the erroneous admission, double jeopardy does not bar retrial.' 3
Nevertheless, the Court recognized an exception to this general rule when
a reversal occurs due to insufficient evidence."3 In Burks v. United
217. Davis, 656 F.2d at 159.
218. United States v. Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152, 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
219. Id. at 1156.
220. United States v. Deiesus, 806 F.2d 31, 36-7 (2d Cir. 1986).
221. United States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 1987).
222. Bonilla Romero v. United States, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
223. DeJesus v. United States, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987).
224. Grandison v. United States, 479 U.S. 845 (1986).
225. Davis v. United States, 456 U.S. 930 (1982).
226. 488 U.S. 33 (1988).
227. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38 (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896)).
228. Id. (citing Bail, 163 U.S. at 466).
229. Id. at 34.
230. Id. (conceding that if the evidence had been barred, the government would have at-
tempted to offer additional evidence to satisfy its burden).
231. Id. at 39.
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States, 2 the Court held that while reversal based on erroneous admission of
evidence allows the defendant a trial free from error, reversal due to insuffi-
ciency of evidence amounts to an acquittal."' A distinct policy rationale ex-
ists for an acquittal in the second circumstance since society holds no "interest
in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that
the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. WackerX
a. Facts
The court convicted Edith Wacker and six other defendants of various
drug related offenses associated with a large marijuana harvesting and distribu-
tion operation located on her parent's farm.' The defendants appealed one
of the convictions pertaining to the use of a firearm and argued for reversal of
the conviction due to insufficiency of evidence.' While the evidence suf-
ficed at the time of conviction, the Supreme Court changed the standard for
determining what constitutes "use of a firearm" before the Tenth Circuit decid-
ed the case on appeal.' To obtain a conviction for "use" of a firearm at the
time of the trial, the prosecution needed to establish that the defendants en-
joyed "ready access" to the firearm and that the firearm served as an "integral
part" of the criminal activity.2 9 However, the Supreme Court subsequently
changed the standard to require that the defendants actively employ the fire-
241arm during the crime.
b. Decision
Relying on Lockhart, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court based on
error rather than on "pure insufficiency of evidence," meaning double jeopardy
could not bar a second trial on remand."4 In the district court, the govern-
ment produced evidence commensurate with the jury instruction based on the
legal standard used at the time.'c Thus, the Tenth Circuit asserted its unwill-
ingness to reverse a conviction solely because the prosecution failed to present
evidence which they did not know was relevant at the time.'
232. 437 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1978).
233. Burks, 437 U.S. at 14-16.
234. Id. at 16.
235. 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 136 (1996).
236. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1460-62.
237. Id. at 1459-60.
238. Id. at 1464-65 (citing United States v. Bailey, 116 S. CL 501, 509 (1995) (changing the
standard for "use" of a firearm to "actively employed the firearm during and in relation to the
predicate crime")).
239. Id. at 1463.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1465.
242. Id. at 1464-65.
243. Id. at 1465.
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2. United States v. Miller'"
a. Facts
The district court convicted Brian Miller and Michael Hicks of various
drug related offenses.2' The judge incorrectly instructed the jury regarding
one of the grounds for conviction relating to the "use" of a firearm.2" Hicks
appealed asserting that with a proper instruction the jury might not have con-
victed him on the use of a firearm in relation to the drug trafficking crime.'
While the government contended that Hicks carried the firearm, the jury en-
joyed the liberty to reject that assertion and to convict him solely on the basis
that he concealed the firearm in his van." If so, similar to Wacker, the jury
would have passed a conviction that was inconsistent with the new standard
for "use" and "carrying" of a firearm. Since the jury returned a general ver-
dict, uncertainty existed as to whether it relied on the incorrect instruction.2'
b. Decision
Relying on its holding in Wacker, the Tenth Circuit found that it could
remand for a new trial only if the jury could have returned a guilty verdict if
it received proper instruction in the first instance.' The court found suffi-
cient evidence to support a guilty verdict under the "carry" prong of the stat-
ute (not alleged in Wacker) since "carry" under the statute only requires that
the defendant possessed, through dominion and control, and transported the
firearmn." Since Hicks carried the firearm in his van during the crime's
commission, the jury could have returned a guilty verdict even with a proper
instruction. Thus, the Tenth Circuit remanded for a new trial. 2
C. Analysis
Lockhart and Burks, together with their progeny, Wacker and Miller, set
forth the rule and exceptions to the rule regarding retrials due to trial error and
insufficiency of evidence. Trial error does not bar retrials as long as sufficient
evidence exists for a jury to convict. 3 However, if the court reverses due to
the lack of sufficient evidence to convict, then retrial violates double jeopardy
244. 84 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 443 (1996).
245. Miller, 84 F.3d at 1247-48.
246. Id. at 1257.
247. Id. at 1257. The jury was told that it could find one of the defendants guilty of one of
the counts if he "used" the firearms and he "used" them if he merely concealed them in his van.
ld This instruction was contrary to the requirements for "used" set forth in Bailey. See supra note
238 and accompanying text.
248. Miller, 84 F.3d at 1257.
249. Id at 1257.
250. Id. at 1258.
251. Id. at 1258-60.
252. Id. at 1260-61. But see United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564, 1567-68 (10th Cir. 1996)
(addressing the same issue on appeal but finding that the evidence was not sufficient to support a
conviction under a proper instruction).
253. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38.
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since the reversal amounts to an acquittal.' However, if the insufficiency
prompting the reversal stems from a changed legal standard" or an erro-
neous jury instruction,' as opposed to "true insufficiency of evidence" 7
then Lockhart applies and retrial may proceed.2 s
D. Other Circuits
In United States v. Lanzoti,' the Seventh Circuit allowed a retrial
where the jury found the defendants guilty on several counts for participating
in an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.' After a
jury conviction on all counts, the defendants argued, and the government con-
ceded, that the government lacked sufficient evidence to support conviction on
one of the counts."' The government changed its theory of conviction to one
the evidence supported, and the Seventh Circuit determined that, since the new
theory was not argued to the jury, the interests of justice required a new tri-
al.' The defendants moved to dismiss contending that, because the evidence
failed to support a conviction on the theory actually communicated to the jury,
double jeopardy barred a new trial.23 The district court denied the
defendant's motion and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that the
government's failure to support its legal theory by the facts proved at trial fell
outside of the functional equivalent of an acquittal as defined by Lockhart and
Burks.' True insufficiency of evidence requires the factual innocence of the
defendant and does not derive from a court's determination of incongruity
between the legal theory of conviction and the government's facts.'
The Eighth Circuit permitted retrial where the government convicted the
defendant under the wrong capital murder provision.' Although the Eighth
Circuit conceded the defendant's double jeopardy assertion contained "consid-
erable logic" since there was insufficient evidence in the first trial to support
the felony charge, it distinguished between reversal for true insufficiency of
evidence and reversal for a legally defective indictment. 7 The Eighth Cir-
cuit recognized the difficulty of prevailing against a retrial based on a showing
of insufficiency of evidence to the extent that it amounted to an acquittal.m
However, the court defended the high standard, as a matter of policy, since
without it appellate courts would not vehemently reverse due to trial error "if
254. Burks, 437 U.S. at 15-16.
255. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1465.
256. Miller, 84 F.3d at 1257-58.
257. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1465.
258. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38.
259. 90 F.3d 1217 (7th Cir. 1996).
260. Lanzoti, 90 F.3d at 1219; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
261. 1d& at 1219-20.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1220.
264. Id. at 1221-22.
265. Id. at 1222-23.
266. Parker v. Norris, 64 F.3d 1178, 1180-82 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 820
(1996).
267. Parker, 64 F.3d at 1181 (citing Ball, 163 U.S. at 671-72).
268. Id.
[Vol. 74:2
CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
they knew that reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably
beyond the reach of further prosecution."2
CONCLUSION
The law affords little refuge for defendants under the umbrella of the
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. Although conviction for posses-
sion of different drugs does not require the proof of unique facts as set forth
in Blockburger, the government treats the possession of each substance as a
separate offense. Further, retrial for the same offense is not barred if the insuf-
ficiency of evidence in the first trial results from a changed legal standard or
an erroneous jury instruction. Even these seemingly harsh laws appear rela-
tively benign compared to the battering that a defendant must endure in the
realm of in rem civil forfeitures. Relying on antiquated law dating back some
two hundred years in the admiralty arena, the Court emphatically held that the
government may confiscate a defendant's property and institute criminal pun-
ishment for the same drug related offense.
It is unusual for circuit courts to misunderstand the Supreme Court's posi-
tion as profoundly as did the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
in the civil forfeiture arena. Ursery changed the course of double jeopardy
jurisprudence. Like the Tenth Circuit, many courts are struggling to understand
this latest development and to realign themselves with the nation's highest
Court.
Virginia Grace Brannon
269. d at 1182 (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)).
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